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Abstract—Performing some task among a set of agents 
requires the use of some protocol that regulates the interactions 
between them. If those agents are rational, they may try to 
subvert the protocol for their own benefit, in an attempt to reach 
an outcome that provides greater utility. We revisit the 
traditional notion of self-enforcing protocols implemented using 
existing game-theoretic solution concepts, we describe its 
shortcomings in real-world applications, and we propose a new 
notion of self-enforcing protocols, namely co-utile protocols. The 
latter represent a solution concept that can be implemented 
without a coordination mechanism in situations when traditional 
self-enforcing protocols need a coordination mechanism. Co-utile 
protocols are preferable in decentralized systems of rational 
agents because of their efficiency and fairness. We illustrate the 
application of co-utile protocols to information technology, 
specifically to preserving the privacy of query profiles of 
database/search engine users.  
Keywords— Information Technology and Information Systems; 
Operations Management; Operations Research 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Consider a set of agents who want to perform a task that 
requires the collaboration of all of them (like performing a 
computation in which each agent gives an input and expects 
some output, making a collective decision based on the 
preferences of the agents, etc.). For the task to be successfully 
completed, a clear set of rules that govern the expected 
behavior of each agent, as well as the communication between 
agents must be set up. We refer to such a set of rules as a 
protocol. 
We are interested in designing protocols with respect to a 
given security model such that the agents taking part in them 
cannot subvert them. The intention of this paper is to deal with 
the security issues that may arise in a protocol with respect to a 
rational model. More precisely, we consider systems where the 
agents are rational and, thus, they may try to subvert the 
protocol, if by doing so they can increase their benefit. Our 
goal is to design self-enforcing protocols, or, in other words, 
protocols that agents are rationally interested in following. 
The usual way to approach self-enforcing protocols is to 
use game theory, which is a mathematical tool that models the 
interaction between self-interested agents that act strategically. 
We say that an agent is self-interested when she defines a 
partial order over the possible outcomes of the interaction. 
Intuitively, one can think of this partial order as a ranking of 
the outcomes of the interaction. For each agent, we call this 
partial order the preference of the agent. 
We say that an agent acts strategically when she takes into 
account her knowledge and her expectations about the system 
and about other agents before she decides on her strategy. 
Game theory identifies subsets of outcomes (a.k.a. solution 
concepts) that the agents would be most interested in 
achieving. In our proposal we focus on equilibrium solutions, 
i.e., sets of outcomes that rational agents have no intention to 
deviate from. Moreover, we focus our attention on the practical 
approaches one should take in order to implement such 
solution concepts. 
Self-enforcing protocols are interesting because when 
rational agents are present, they follow them without the 
protocol designer having to resort to an enforcing mechanism 
(such as personal commitment of the agents or law 
enforcement systems). 
In order to design self-enforcing protocols, one should start 
by taking into account all preferences of all agents. However, 
the preferences of the agents can be either public or private. 
Intuitively, agreeing on an equilibrium is easy if the 
preferences are public: each agent can compute the set of 
equilibria on her own (the agents may be computationally 
unlimited), and the protocol is then used to agree on a suitable 
equilibrium. Formally, this means that the outputs of the 
respective protocol in every run represent an equilibrium of the 
game. In this paper, we focus mainly on agents with private 
preferences. This scenario is similar to that of mechanism 
design, but as detailed below, we take a different approach to 
address it. 
We consider two different types of self-enforcing protocols: 
those in which each agent is required to report (truthfully or 
not) her utility, and those that do not require agents to report 
her utility. We refer to the former as coordination protocols 
and to the latter as co-utile protocols. Both cases are 
interesting: coordination protocols may lead to better outcomes 
for all of the participants but have the difficulty of having to 
deal with the truthfulness of the information about preferences 
provided by the agents, while co-utile protocols are especially 
appealing because they assume only a distributed system and 
they achieve a good level of efficiency and fairness without 
agents having to report their preferences. 
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Contribution and plan of this paper. In this paper, we 
review self-enforcing protocols (Section II) and distinguish 
between those whose outcomes depend on the preferences of 
the agents given as inputs (Section III) and those that do not 
(Section IV). In connection with the latter, we introduce the 
notions of strict co-utility and relaxed co-utility (Section IV). 
In Section V, we illustrate the power of co-utile protocols for a 
specific application: preserving the privacy of the query 
profiles of database users. In Section VI, we highlight the 
differences between self-enforcing protocols obtained via co-
utility and via mechanism design. Finally, Section VII lists 
some conclusions. 
II. SELF-ENFORCING PROTOCOLS 
When performing a distributed computation in a P2P 
system of rational agents, each of the agents may embrace the 
protocol or deviate from it. Without an enforcing mechanism, a 
rational agent adopts the strategy that maximizes her utility. In 
this section we review the notion of self-enforcing protocol. 
We start with an example of a protocol that is not self-
enforcing: the congestion avoidance mechanism of the TCP 
protocol, used in Internet to avoid losing data segments in case 
of congestion. In plain terms, the transfer rate of TCP segments 
is slowly increased until a congestion is detected, which 
triggers a steep reduction in the transfer rate. 
Consider the case of two agents Alice and Bob that are 
transferring data through the same router. We assume that for 
both players only the following two options are available: 
either use an implementation of the TCP protocol that properly 
includes the congestion avoidance mechanism or use a 
dishonest implementation that always transfers data at 
maximum rate. If both Alice and Bob use congestion 
avoidance, the transfer rate of both will adapt to the congestion 
in the network (and will be fair). If only Alice uses the 
implementation that includes the congestion avoidance 
mechanism, congestions will happen more frequently (because 
Bob always transfers at maximum rate) and Alice will have 
less bandwidth available to her. The reverse would happen if 
only Bob uses an implementation with the congestion 
avoidance mechanism. If none of them uses the congestion 
avoidance mechanism, the network will suffer from continuous 
congestion and both will get a poor service. Let us assume that 
the bandwidths available are those in Table I. According to the 
table, independently of what the other does, it is always better 
for oneself to use the dishonest implementation (in game 
theoretic terms, to be dishonest is a dominant strategy). If Alice 
and Bob act rationally, both will select the dishonest 
implementation, thereby breaking what the TCP specification 
says. Thus, TCP congestion avoidance is not self-enforcing. In 
other words, using the honest implementation of the TCP 
protocol is not the rational approach for agents pursuing 
bandwidth maximization.  
Self-enforcing protocols rely heavily on game theory, 
especially on the notion of equilibrium. An outcome is an 
equilibrium if no agent has incentives to change her strategy in 
that outcome; in other words, provided that all other agents 
keep their strategies unchanged, no agent can modify her 
strategy to increase her utility. Several notions of equilibrium 
have been proposed in game theory. Some of the equilibrium 
notions are related, being either refinements (specializations of 
other equilibria notions that reduce the number of solutions) or 
generalizations. Fig. 1 depicts the relation among several types 
of equilibria; arrows in the figure go from a refined to a more 
general equilibrium. For each notion of equilibrium there may 
be multiple solutions (outcomes that fulfill the requirements of 
the equilibrium). Which of these solutions will emerge is not 
determined by the solution concept and this leads to 
questioning if any of them will eventually emerge. By refining 
a notion of equilibrium, the number of solutions is reduced; in 
this sense, the remaining solutions become stronger. However, 
by using a refined equilibrium notion we may be excluding 
solutions that are, indeed, preferred to those that remain. When 
defining self-enforcing protocols it is, therefore, preferable to 
focus on a general notion of equilibrium (rather than on a more 
refined one) and rely on the protocol to enforce a specific 
solution. 
Next, we formally define self-enforcing protocols.  
Definition 1. (Self-enforcing protocol). Let G be a 
Bayesian game, i.e., G = (N,A,S,T,p,U), where N is a set of n 
TABLE I. BANDWIDTH AVAILABLE TO ALICE AND BOB ACCORDING 
TO THE SELECTED IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TCP PROTOCOL: HONEST 
(WITH CONGESTION AVOIDANCE) AND DISHONEST (WITHOUT 
CONGESTION AVOIDANCE) 
  Bob  
  Honest Dishonest 
Alice Honest 2,2 1,3 
 Dishonest 3,1 1,1 
 
  
 
Fig 1. Graph of refinements of equilibrium concepts in game theory. The 
arrow goes from a refined to a more general equilibrium. 
agents, A=A1 × … × An, S=S1 × … × Sn, T= T1× … ×Tn ,U=(u1, 
…, un), Ai is the set of possible actions for agent i, Si is the set 
of all strategies of agent i 1 , Ti is the set of private types of 
agent i,  p:T → [0, 1] is a commonly known distribution over 
types and ui:S × T → ℝ is the utility for agent i. Let P:I1 × … × 
In → S1 × … × Sn be a protocol taking inputs (c1, …, cn), with ci ∈ Ii, from agents (1,…, n) and implementing some outcome of 
the game, i.e., outputting in each run a profile strategy of the 
game. We say that P is a self-enforcing protocol for G if for 
every input profile (c1, …, cn) and for any tuple of types (t1, …, 
tn), with ti ∈ Ti, the output P(c1, …, cn) = (s1, …, sn) is an 
equilibrium of the game G and ui(s1, …, sn, t1, …, tn) > 0 for 
all i ∈ {1, …, n}. 
Lower-bounding positive utilities by 0 in the above 
definition entails no loss of generality. Indeed, given a 
different, strictly positive lower bound that one may wish to 
impose on one or more utilities, one can obtain, through an 
affine transformation, an equivalent game G’ (i.e., such that 
there is a bijection between the equilibria in G and G’) such 
that the lower bound on all utilities for G’ is 0. This is so 
because, under standard utility theory, games are insensitive 
(i.e., with respect to equilibria preservation) to any positive 
affine transformation of the payoffs. 
If in Definition 1 we require that for every agent i the set of 
private types Ti have only one element, then we have the 
special case of a game with publicly known utilities. In this 
case, designing a self-enforcing protocol is just a matter of 
agreeing on a suitable equilibrium, e.g., by having the protocol 
implement only that equilibrium, which due to utilities being 
publicly known, anyone can compute. 
For the general case, when agents do have private utilities, 
there are two possible approaches. In the first approach, the 
agents need to report some information about their utilities as 
input to a centralized or distributed computation that will 
output a strategy profile for the set of agents2 . In the second 
approach, one could design a distributed protocol whose output 
does not depend on the agents reporting their preferences. In 
the following sections, we evaluate these two approaches for 
the design of self-enforcing protocols. 
III. COORDINATION PROTOCOL 
A coordination protocol is a self-enforcing protocol that 
takes information about the preferences of the agents as inputs. 
By gathering the preferences of the agents, the coordination 
protocol may compute the set of equilibria and then select a 
suitable one (thus making the protocol self-enforcing). We 
must keep in mind that an agent may report untruthful 
information about her preferences to the coordination protocol 
in an attempt to have it produce an outcome that is better for 
her. 
Note that the fact that the preferences of the agents are put 
together to determine a suitable equilibrium does not imply the 
existence of a central trusted party; the computation can be 
distributed among the agents. 
                                                            
1 Depending on the actual context, the set of all strategies of agent i may be either her pure 
strategies, or her mixed strategies or another type of well-defined game theoretical strategies. 
2 Keep in mind that agents may report untruthfully, if this increases their utility. 
Definition 2. (Coordination protocol). Let G be a Bayesian 
game and let P: T1 × … × Tn × X → S be a protocol that takes 
as inputs the types that each agent reports together with 
possibly some additional information and implements some 
outcome of G. We say that P is a coordination protocol if P is 
a self-enforcing protocol such that ∃   t1 ∈ T1,…,tn ∈ Tn,   ∃  
i1,…,ik, j ∈ N, i1 ≠ j,…,ik ≠ j and  ∃t’i1 ∈ Ti1,…,t’ik ∈ Tik, with t’i1 
≠ ti1,…, t
’
ik ≠ tik, such that uj(P(t1,…, t
’
i1
,…,t’ik,…,tn,x), t1,…, tn) 
≠  uj(P(t1,…,ti1,…,tik,…,tn,x), t1,…, tn), i.e., there exists a tuple 
of types and at least one agent whose utility depends on the 
type that one or more agents provide to the protocol. 
Because the output of the coordination protocol is an 
equilibrium of the game, no agent has incentives to play a 
strategy different from the one suggested by the coordination 
protocol. The type of equilibrium notion is not determined by 
the definition. It was previously noted that it is better to rely on 
a general notion of equilibrium (to avoid discarding solutions 
that provide greater utility) and use the coordination protocol to 
select a specific solution. Note also that being an equilibrium is 
not enough. We also require the utility of each player to be 
greater than zero. With this condition we model the fact that 
users are entitled to decide between participating in the 
protocol or not. Assuming that a user that refrains from 
participating in the protocol gets zero utility, to get anyone 
interested in participating her expected utility must be greater 
than zero. 
To illustrate the design of coordination protocols, we will 
use the following simple game. A wife and a husband are 
trying to decide what to do in the evening (this is the 
computation under consideration and the goal is to provide 
self-enforcing protocols for it). Each of them has to decide 
between going to the opera or to a football match. The wife 
prefers the opera, while the husband prefers the football match. 
This the well-known Battle of the Sexes (BoS) game [3]. 
Table II gives an example of actual utilities (payoffs) for 
husband and wife: we make the assumptions that aW > bW > 
c and aH > bH > c. BoS is mainly a coordination game (both 
husband and wife prefer to go out together rather than on their 
own) but it also has elements of competitiveness (their 
preferences are different). In line with our previous discussion, 
we consider that the utilities are private: neither the wife nor 
the husband know the preferences of the other. The wife’s view 
of the game is shown in Table III, where the values of aH, bH, 
cH and dH are unknown to her. The husband’s view of the game 
is the reciprocal of Table III.  
TABLE II. BATTLE OF THE SEXES (BOS) PAYOFFS. 
  Husband  
  Opera Football 
Wife Opera aW, bH c, c 
 Football c, c bW, aH 
 
In the remainder of the section we evaluate, through 
examples, how the coordination protocol can be designed. 
Example 1. In this example, we design a coordination 
protocol that outputs a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for a 
game in which the utilities of every agent do not depend on the 
secret types of the other agents. 
Intuitively, a Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile in which 
each strategy is a best response to the strategies of the other 
agents. Thus, to determine a pure strategy Nash equilibrium it 
is enough for each agent to report her/his best responses to 
each of the possible actions of the other agent.  For instance, if 
the wife reported truthfully, she would report “opera” as her 
best response to “opera”. 
The proposed protocol is as follows: (i) each agent reports 
her/his best response to each of the actions of the other player, 
(ii) the wife, additionally, ranks the strategies that correspond 
to her best responses, (iii) the set of equilibria associated to the 
preferences reported in (i) is computed, and (iv) the protocol 
selects among the computed equilibria the one with highest 
rank for the wife. 
If each agent reported her preferences truthfully, the 
proposed protocol computes the set of equilibria of the 
underlying game. However, because the reported preferences 
affect the output of the protocol, agents may have incentives to 
be untruthful, which may lead to an outcome of the protocol 
that is not an equilibrium of the underlying game.  
It can be shown that for the BoS game the proposed 
protocol makes truthful reporting a dominant strategy for the 
wife (because doing so yields the best equilibrium for her). A 
rational husband, on the contrary, may be willing to lie about 
his best response to “opera” if he believes that both (opera, 
opera) and (football, football) are equilibria of the underlying 
game (lying is meant to leave (football, football) as the only 
equilibrium). Therefore, the set of equilibria computed by the 
protocol in step (iii) is {(opera, opera), (football, football)} if 
both agents report truthfully, and {(football, football)} if the 
husband lies. The strategy profile selected in step (iv) is (opera, 
opera) and (football, football), respectively. In any case, the 
outcome of the protocol is an equilibrium of the BoS game that 
gives positive utility to all the agents.  
The protocol proposed in Example 1 returns a pure Nash 
equilibrium when BoS is the underlying game. For other 
underlying games this may not be the case. In general, to come 
up with coordination protocols we need to be able to adjust the 
utilities of the underlying game. This adjustment can be done 
via rewards and punishments, or due to the fact that the utilities 
used are transferable. A typical example of such a protocol is 
the Vickrey auction (a.k.a second-price auction) in which the 
price paid by the winner can be seen as a punishment. In 
contrast to the game described in Example 1, a Vickrey auction 
is a game in which the utilities of the agents may depend on the 
secret types of the other agents. 
Example 2. A Vickrey auction [4] is a sealed-bid auction 
(each agent submits her bid without the others knowing the 
value). The good is assigned to the highest bidder and the price 
to pay is the second highest bid. If we assume that each agent 
has a valuation for the good, the dominant strategy for each 
player is to bid her true value. 
The coordination protocol for the Vickrey auction is the 
following: gather the bids from each of the agents; the 
proposed strategy is the profile of collected bids. Because 
bidding her own valuation is a dominant strategy for each 
player, the proposed strategy is an equilibrium. Moreover, none 
of the agents gets a negative utility: except for the winner, all 
agents get zero utility, and the utility of the winner equals her 
valuation minus the second highest valuation (which results in 
a non-negative utility for the winner). Getting zero utility does 
not seem to conform to the definition of self-enforcing protocol 
(Definition 2), where all participants should get positive utility; 
however, note that participants in an auction have 
positive expected utility (because they may win). 
IV. SUPPRESSING COORDINATION MECHANISMS VIA CO-
UTILITY 
We have seen in the previous section that designing a 
coordination protocol to reach consensus on an equilibrium 
solution is a complex task. The main issue is that an agent may 
report untruthful preferences in an attempt to have the protocol 
produce an outcome that is preferred by her. One way to avoid 
this issue is to simply avoid taking agent preferences into 
account. The goal of this section is to design self-enforcing 
protocols that do not require the agents to report their 
preferences. We refer to such protocols as co-utile protocols. 
We think of a co-utile protocol as a protocol in which a 
solution that is beneficial to the participating agents is achieved 
in a natural manner. For that, helping other agents must be the 
best strategy. Of course, that is only possible in a controlled 
environment or, in game-theoretic terms, for a specific class of 
agent utilities.  Moreover, we require that a co-utile protocol 
does not need any information about the types of the 
participating agents, i.e., a co-utile protocol is independent of 
such types. In other words, we explicitly require that a co-utile 
protocol not be a coordination protocol.3 
The setting we assume for co-utile protocols is suitable for 
sequential games. In other words, agents may take turns 
selecting the strategies to play. We start by delimiting the set of 
games that are feasible for co-utile protocols: 
Definition 3. (Co-utility-amenable game). Let G be a 
sequential Bayesian game for n agents. We say that G is a co-
utility-amenable game if the utility of any agent is independent 
of the types of the other agents, i.e., ∀i, j, with i ≠ j and ∀ti, t’i ∈ 
                                                            
3 In light of Example 1, it is clear that this is not a superfluous condition: there exit protocols for 
co-utility amenable games that are coordination protocols.  
TABLE III. WIFE’S VIEW OF THE UNDERLYING GAME. 
  Husband  
  Opera Football 
Wife Opera aW, bH  c, cH 
 Football c, dH  bW, aH  
 
Ti we have that uj(s1, …, sn, t1, …, ti, …, tn) = uj(s1, …, sn, t1, 
…, t’i, …, tn). 
In the rest of this paper we focus only on games with two 
agents. Intuitively, co-utile protocols are only feasible in a 
setting in which for every agent Pi, with i ∈ {1, 2}, helping the 
other agent is actually a rational choice. We consider the 
following two refinements. 
We start with the definition of strictly co-utile protocols, 
where intuitively both agents maximize their utilities. 
Definition 4. (Strict co-utility). Let G be a co-utility-
amenable game for two agents. Let P be a self-enforcing 
protocol for G, such that P is not a coordination protocol. We 
say P is a strictly co-utile protocol if ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ∀s’i ∈ 
Si and ∀s’j ∈ Sj and ∀ti ∈ Ti and ∀tj ∈ Tj , with i ≠ j ,we have 
that ui(si, sj, ti, tj) ≥ ui(s’i, s’j, ti, tj), where the outcome of P on 
input (ti,tj) is (si, sj). 
Finally, we give the definition of relaxed co-utile protocols, 
where at least one agent maximizes her utility. 
Definition 5. (Relaxed co-utility). Let G be co-utility-
amenable game for two agents. Let P be a self-enforcing 
protocol for G, such that P is not a coordination protocol. We 
say P is a relaxedly co-utile protocol if ∃i ∈ {1, 2}, ∀s’i ∈ 
Si and ∀s’j ∈ Sj and ∀ti ∈ Ti and ∀tj ∈ Tj , with i ≠ j , we have 
that ui(si, sj, ti, tj) ≥ ui(s’i, s’j, ti, tj), where the outcome of P on 
input (ti,tj) is (si, sj). 
V. APPLICATION OF CO-UTILITY TO P2P ANONYMOUS QUERIES 
We now give one application of co-utility to illustrate the 
power of this concept. The application is related to information 
and communication technology. In this context, if players’ 
interests include privacy or anonymity, a protocol is co-utile if 
privacy preservation or anonymity preservation of an 
individual becomes a goal that rationally interests other 
individuals. We start with pairwise interactions between peer 
agents and then generalize to interactions between any number 
of agents. 
A. Pairwise interaction of agents 
Consider a system with n peers P1, …, Pn who wish to 
query a database or a search engine DB while keeping their 
interests (i.e. their query profile) private; blurring one’s query 
profile is, intuitively, the specific notion of privacy in this 
example [1]. The interactions among peers take place in pairs 
of agents. More precisely, given two agents Pi and Pj that 
decide to interact with each other, the underlying game of their 
interaction is as follows 4: the actions available to agent Pi, who 
plays the role of the initiator in this game, are either to submit 
by herself to the database a query q she is interested in or to 
forward the query to Pj. Formally, the set of actions available 
to Pi as initiator is Ai = {submit, forward}. 
                                                            
4 The following game does not impose any constraints on how the decision of choosing the 
partner agent is made, thus giving us maximum freedom for modeling various possibilities. Both 
agents could decide by using a secure two-party computation that it is in their own best interest 
to collaborate. Or the agent who holds a query that needs to be answered may decide to 
randomly pick her partner and start the query game with that agent. These are just two possible 
settings when the interaction may arise. One could, of course, envision other possible settings. 
The actions available to player Pj playing the role of the 
responder in this game are to submit the query of Pi to the 
database or to decline the submission. Formally, the set of 
actions available to Pj as responder is Aj = {submit, decline}. 
Moreover, the utilities of any agent Pi are defined as 
follows: 
ui(ti(q), fi(q), Yi) =  αi ⋅ ti(q)  ⋅ fi(q) + H(Yi). 
The notation5 has the following semantics: q represents a 
query; ti(q) represents the time left until Pi would like q to be 
answered;  fi(q)=1 if Pi originates q and is interested in getting 
the answer to q from another agent Pj, and fi(q) =0 otherwise (q 
not originated by Pi or Pi gets the answer to q directly from 
DB). By H(Yi) we measure the total privacy for the set of 
queries Yi that have been submitted to the database by Pi, 
where H is the Shannon entropy. Intuitively, the higher this 
entropy, the flatter the histogram of frequencies of Yi(t), and 
the more ignorant DB stays about the query interests of Pi. 
The parameter αi describes how much Pi values a quick 
response to her query q compared to possibly reducing her 
amount of privacy by adding the query q to her vector Yi of 
already submitted queries. One could, of course, compute the 
value of the utility ui for any query q, including the queries that 
agent Pi is not interested in. However, in that case ui(ti(q), fi(q), 
Yi) = H(Yi), so ui is just a measure of her privacy. The 
interesting case arises when q is a query Pi is interested in but 
did not receive an answer for q yet. 
Additionally, we make the following assumptions: if an 
agent Pi submits a query to DB, then Pi will get an answer 
immediately. If an agent Pi submits a query to another agent Pj, 
then Pj is expected to accept or reject the query within 
a timeout time span (measured in seconds). In order to further 
simplify the presentation, we assume that, by default, Pj is not 
interested in the answer to the query q, i.e., fj(q) = 0.   
After each action, the agents that have been influenced by 
that action will update their values for the functions t, f and for 
their respective sets Y. For example, if Pi submits q directly to 
the database, ti(q) remains unchanged, fi(q) becomes 0 and Yi: = 
Yi∪{q}. Obviously, in this case, the utility of the partner 
agent Pj with respect to query q (i.e., uj(tj(q), fj(q), Yj)) remains 
unchanged. 
In a similar way, if Pi submits q to Pj and Pj rejects the 
query by replying back to Pi with an appropriate message, 
then Pi updates her internal states in the following way: ti(q): = 
ti(q) − timeout,  fi(q) remains 1 and Yi  remains unchanged. 
Thus, the utility of Pi in this case is (ti − timeout)⋅αi + H(Yi). 
For Pj  no internal state changes: tj(q) = 0, fj(q)= 
1 and Yj remains unchanged. 
Finally, if Pi submits q to Pj and Pj accepts the query by 
replying back to Pi with the appropriate answer obtained from 
the database, then Pi updates her internal states in the following 
                                                            
5 In this section, we define the utility functions to depend only on the current states of the 
agents: In our case, the current states of an agent P
i are ti(q), fi(q), Yi  and   αi . The current 
states are, in turn, computed from the initial states of P
i
 and the partial strategies that any of the 
players chose so far in the game. This is just an alternative equivalent definition that we take 
here to simplify the presentation.  
way: ti(q): = ti(q) − timeout, fi(q): = 0 and Yi stays unchanged. 
This means that Pi has the following utility: ui(q) = H(Yi). 
Similarly, Pj updates her internal states in the following 
way: tj(q) = 0 (this is unchanged), fj(q) switches to 0 and Yj: = 
Yj∪{q}, where by Yj∪{q} we denote the fact that the query q is 
appropriately added to the vector Yj of queries already 
submitted. Thus, Pj has utility uj(q) = H(Yj∪{q}).  
Since Pi does not know in advance whether Pj will answer 
her query or not, we make the assumption that Pi believes with 
probability 0.5 her query will be answered. It is easy to see that 
the game described above is a co-utile amenable game. 
For the game formally described above, we design the 
following protocol which we argue is an equilibrium. 
Protocol 1. (Two-party anonymous query submission) 
Given a query q that Pi is interested in and has not yet obtained 
an answer for, a vector Yi of queries that Pi has submitted so far 
to DB and a time ti that Pi is willing to wait for obtaining the 
answer, if ui(ti(q), 0,  Yi∪{q}) > 1/2⋅(ui(ti(q) − timeout,1, Yi) + 
ui(ti(q) − timeout, 0, Yi)) then Pi submits q to DB, 
else Pi submits q to Pj. In turn, if Pj receives a query q from Pi, 
then she rejects the query if H(Yj) ≥ H(Yj∪{q}); otherwise, 
Pj accepts it and answers it correctly after inquiring the 
database. 
Lemma. The protocol described above is at least a 
relaxedly co-utile protocol for the two-player anonymous 
submission query game. 
Proof: By the definition of the utilities it is easy to see that 
the above protocol is an equilibrium. Moreover, the players do 
not reveal any information about their secret types, so the 
above protocol is independent of them. Finally, if H(Yj) > 
0 and H(Yj∪{q}) > 0 and H(Yi∪{q}) > 0 and 1/2⋅(ui(ti(q) − 
timeout, 0, Yi) + ui(ti(q) − timeout, 1, Yi)) > 0, then the protocol 
is co-utile. 
If Pi is strictly interested in maintaining her level of privacy 
by not submitting q to the database and if Pj is strictly 
interested in increasing her level of privacy by submitting q to 
the database, then the protocol is strictly co-utile. Finally, in 
any other case, the protocol described above is at least 
relaxedly co-utile since player Pi’s  mixed strategy ensures he 
obtains the highest possible utility. ¨  
Formally, the game described above is a Bayesian game 
where each agent Pi has an unknown type represented by αi and 
the interest (or lack of it) for the answer to query q. These two 
values are unknown to the other agents. However, even if her 
type were known to the other agents, this would not influence 
the choices she makes. This holds true for both cases 
when Pi plays the role of the initiator or the role of the 
responder. 
B. Interaction of any number of agents 
Finally, let us have a look at the general case of n agents 
participating in the system. In each of these interactions, a pair 
of agents aim at playing the anonymous query game described 
in the beginning of the section. We assume that each pair of 
players uses anonymous channels and the initiator agent 
randomly chooses her partner, i.e., the responder agent. Due to 
the anonymous channels assumption and also due to the 
utilities of the agents, any two played protocols are 
independent of each other: even if the agents would keep track 
of which other agents have helped them or not so far when 
asked to submit queries on their behalf (i.e., even if agents may 
try to hold grudge on the other agents), it is clear that the best 
choice for each initiator or responder is to make a choice about 
her next move given only her current value of the utility and 
the query that she wants answered or, respectively, she has just 
received. So, in conclusion, in our example, the interactions 
among the n agents are, in fact, a series of independent two-
party protocols. 
VI. SELF-ENFORCING PROTOCOLS AND MECHANISM DESIGN 
Mechanism design is a discipline within game theory that 
bears some resemblance to our self-enforcing protocols 
proposal. The starting point in mechanism design is a set of 
agents that hold some private information θ = (θ1, …, θn) ∈ Θ, 
where Θ is the environment space, and a function f (the social 
choice function) that, given a specific state of the 
environment θ, generates the most socially desirable action. 
The goal is to implement the social choice function as the 
equilibria of a game. The diagram in Fig. 2 (extracted from [2]) 
illustrates this. In the diagram M is the set of messages (the 
information that agents report; if agents report truthfully, the 
message is m = θ, but note that agents act strategically) and g is 
an outcome function that describes the actions taken for 
every m ∈ M. The pair (M, g) is known as a game form, and 
when a state of the environment θ is realized, (M, g, 
θ) becomes a game. The goal is that the equilibria of the latter 
game be optimal according to the social choice function.  
The main difference between mechanism design an self-
enforcing protocols has to do with the social choice function. 
While the goal in mechanism design is to attain a socially 
desirable solution, in self-enforcing algorithms we only aim at 
giving each agent enough utility for her to be interested in 
participating. In this sense, self-enforcing algorithms have a 
broader field of application than mechanism design.  
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
We have revisited the concept of self-enforcing protocols, a 
class of protocols that rational agents are interested in 
  
Fig 2. Given a social choice function f that maps types (up-left) to a 
socially desired outcome (up-right), the goal of mechanism design is to 
come up with a game whose equilibrium implements f (down). 
following. We have highlighted that there are important, 
widely used protocols that are not self-enforcing (e.g. the TCP 
congestion avoidance protocol). 
We have revisited one approach for the design of self-
enforcing protocols which relies on a coordination mechanism 
that helps the agents to reach a satisfactory solution and we 
have defined a second approach (co-utility) that does not 
require the use of a coordination function. For co-utile 
protocols we have investigated the amount of fairness that one 
can achieve. This has led to two definitions of co-utile 
protocols: strictly co-utile protocols implement equilibria 
where everyone achieves her maximum utility, while in 
relaxedly co-utile protocols, everyone achieves at least a fair 
level of utility.  
Beyond a theoretical discussion of self-enforcing protocols, 
we have also given an example of co-utile protocols that arise 
in information and communication technology, namely 
retrieving information from a database in an anonymous 
manner. For this example, we have defined a formal game-
theoretic model of the utilities of the agents and we have 
provided a co-utile protocol for the anonymous query game. 
Finally, we have compared self-enforcing protocols to 
mechanism design, a discipline in game theory that can be 
viewed as related. We conclude that self-enforcing protocols 
have a broader field of application. 
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